Menzon vs Petilla

Facts:

In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte.

Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath of office.

In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.

As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued. Rubillar replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not appointed to the post since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of.

As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive his salary as vice governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.

It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled to the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice­‐governor. During the pendency of this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed Governor of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy

Held: Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.

In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.

There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments

Held:  The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting.

The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections.

The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by the Local Government Code.

Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.

The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor.

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.

Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in this case where for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might happen to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations.

The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.

The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent vacancy, viz:

Section 49:

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Issue: Whether or not Menzon is entitled to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor

Held:  In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.

There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.

Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 [1974])

(G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991)

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Victoria vs Comelec

FACTS:

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor.

On February 15, 1993, DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III designated private respondent Jesus James Calisin as acting Vice-Governor of the province pursuant to the COMELEC resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member with petitioner Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 22, 1993. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proportion of the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.

HELD:

No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law. (G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994)

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Navarro vs Comelec

FACTS:

On March 25, 1999, elected Mayor Calimlim died thus creating a vacancy in his position. By virtue of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, Vice Mayor Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, Danny Tamayo, the highest ranking member of Sanggunian, was elevated to position of the Vice-Mayor.

To fill the vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan, Gov. Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed petitioner Purto J. Navarro as member of the said Sanggunian. Navarro belonged to the same party as that of Tamayo.

Private respondents filed a civil action to nullify the appointment of Navarro before RTC Dagupan. When their motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and for the inhibition were denied, private respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. SC referred the case to the CA due to hierarchy of courts.

Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor’s political party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan. Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of RA 7160, the person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor Agbayani to petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.

In the decision of the CA, it concluded that according to the hierarchy, it was the appointment of the 8th Counselor, Rolando Lalas, to the 7th position which created the vacancy, therefore, the appointee should come from the party of Lalas.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Navarro as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan is valid.

HELD:

Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy xxx."

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the law. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.

The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity. (G.R. No. 141307, March 28, 2001)

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Damasen vs Tumamao

Facts:

A permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice Mayor of San Isidro, Isabella when incumbent Vice-Mayor Nelia Tumamao died on December 2, 2004. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of RA 7160, Ligaya Alonzo, the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position.

To fill the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguinang Bayan, Mayor Lim recommended to Governor Padaca the appointment of Oscar Tumamao, also a member of LDP. Tumamao was appointed, took his oath and attended sessions.

On May 2005, Atty. Lucky Damasen, became a member of LDP and got hold of a letter of nomination to the Sanggunian Bayan from provincial chairman of LDP Balauag addressed to Governor Padaca. He was appointed to SB and took his oath. Damasen attended sessions but he was not recognized.

He filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against Tumamao with the RTC, seeking to be declared the rightful member of the SB.

As part of his defense, Tumamao presented Atty. Ernest Soberano who identified a letter dated June 14, 2005, signed by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, which states that the latter was revoking her nomination of Damasen, and that she was confirming Tumamao’s nomination made by Mayor Lim. Later, Tumamao presented Provincial Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter revoking the nomination of Damasen.

RTC ruled in favor of Damasen.

Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA held that Damasen was not entitled to assume the vacant position in the Sangguniang Bayan.

Issue:

Who, between Damasen and Tumamao, is entitled to the contested position?

Held:

Tumamao is entitled to the contested position.

It is undisputed that the law applicable to herein petition is Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160, which provides for the rule on succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. As can be gleaned from Sec. 45, the law provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasen’s insistence in clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona fide member of the LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given to Damasen came after the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in his favor, because the very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee must come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To stress, Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP.

In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the electorate. He himself admits that he was previously a member of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayor under the said party on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he did not resign from the said party when he joined the LDP, and even admitted that his joining the LDP was not because of party ideals, but because he just wanted to. How can the will of the electorate be best served, given the foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this Court were to grant herein petition, it would effectively diminish the party representation of the LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD, not having resigned therefrom, a scenario that defeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary the ratio of Navarro.

What is damning to the cause of Damasen, is the letter of Demaree J.B. Raval, the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the LDP, addressed to Governor Padaca wherein it is categorically stated that Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP.

This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the letter coming from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen still had to be approved by the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasen’s procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, to this Court’s mind, the same merely started the process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic membership thereto. While it may be argued that Damasen was already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot impose such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that the membership of Damasen still had to be endorsed to the National Council for approval, then this Court cannot question such requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is well settled that the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, which this Court cannot meddle in.

Lastly, the records of the case reveal that Tumamao has the nomination of Senator Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman and, therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In addition, he is a member in good standing of the LDP. Thus, given the foregoing, it is this Court’s view that Tumamao has complied with the requirements of law. (G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010)

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Recabo vs Comelec

FACTS:

On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS). His nomination is evidence by the certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of the said political party.

On April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claiming to be the official candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same municipality, also filed his certificate of candidacy. Recabo submitted to the Comelec a copy of the certificate of his nomination and acceptance signed only by one representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the other representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank.

Reyes filed with the Comelec a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Recabo, alleging that Recabo is a substitute candidate of his mother, Candelaria B. Recabo. Reyes submits that since the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by Robert Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS in favor of Candelaria.  Therefore, Candelaria not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an independent candidate only.  And since Candelaria is an independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15, 1998, “no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate.”

Comelec cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Recabo. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, Recabo filed before the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that: 1) His certificate of candidacy and that of his mother whom he substituted substantially complied with the requirements of being official candidate of the LAKAS; 2) The people of Mainit have spoken loud and clear in his favor by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them; and, 3) By cancelling his certificate of candidacy, Comelec acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is valid?

NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: “The certificate of nomination by registered political parties of their official candidates shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so.”

Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP issued an `Authorization’ designating two (2) Party officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath and issue the Official Certificates of Nomination, namely, Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S. Barbers.  Consistent with the foregoing, the certificate of nomination and acceptance, as pointed out by the Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party officers. 

The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his mother did not comply with the requirements of being official candidates of LAKAS Party. The certificate of nomination was invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer as compared to Reyes’ which was signed by the National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.

Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy to curb the evil that the Comelec sought to abate pursuant to its mandate to hold free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. As the respondent Commission stated, “to allow respondent to run under the circumstances adverted to herein would put the election process in mockery and disrepute for we would in effect be allowing an anomalous situation where a single political party may field-in multiple candidates for a single election position.”

It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later withdrew the same on March 31, 1998.  In the meantime, Reyes, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998.  Thereafter, Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2, 1998, in substitution of his mother who had withdrawn earlier.

Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same political party, at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy there was no more void to fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP.  Verily, there was no more vacancy to be substituted for.  Disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery of our electoral process, which envisions one candidate from a political party for each position.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to establish the results of the election.

To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall resolve the second issue first that the “electorate has spoken loud and clear in favor of petitioner by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them”. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the “popular will as clearly expressed in votes cast and counted should prevail, such that the election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his certificate.”

Recabo submitted a ‘Certified List of Candidates with their Votes Obtained’ and an undated `Certified List of Winning Candidates’ both signed by the Acting Election Officer and Election Officer-OIC, respectively.

In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion to rule that: “xxx.  According to Section 17, a certificate of votes can only be “evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly committed in the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated x x x.”  A certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are.”

In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning candidates sufficient evidence of the real results of the election.  Moreover, the certificate of votes submitted does not conform with Section 16 of R.A. 6646. It does not state the number of votes obtained in words; it does not state the number of the precinct, the total number of voters who voted in the precinct and the time issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified true and correct by a certain Lydia P. Mahinay as acting election officer.  As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A. 6646 requires that the certificate of votes be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board of election inspectors. 

Thus, the doctrine that a mere technicality cannot be used to frustrate the people’s will finds no application in the case at bar considering that the results of the election have not been duly established.

ISSUE: Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the position of vice-mayor being the second highest winning candidate?

No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of the election.  A certificate of canvass issued on the basis of the election returns is required to proclaim the elected candidate. It is settled that the disqualification or non-qualification of the winner in a vice mayoralty race does not justify the proclamation of the defeated candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes.  To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.  The second placer is just that, a second placer.  He lost the elections.  He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters.  He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.  We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

ISSUE: How then the vacancy should be filled up?

The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner should be filled up in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become the vice-mayor. (G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)

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Jainal vs Comelec

FACTS:

Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. On May 20, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winning candidate.

On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for the annulment of election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his proclamation as the Mayor. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A.

Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talib’s petition, contending that the latter’s allegations were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court.

On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was likewise annulled. Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of Barangay Adjid as valid.

Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor, who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.

Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant to the COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006.

Jainal likewise filed Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation before the COMELEC EN BANC praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions.

On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of Jainal and ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed him, as Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice Mayor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

HELD: No.

Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation.

With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession.

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. ─ If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner’s proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. (G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007)

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Docena vs Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar

Facts:

On November 19, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed petitioner Agustin B. Docena to succeed Luis B. Capito, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES), who died in office. Docena took his oath on November 22, 1990 and assumed office.

On November 27, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed respondent Socrates B. Alar to the position already occupied by Docena.

On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Capito.

On December 19, 1990, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Luis Santos when he addressed a letter to Alar recalling the appointment. This action was affirmed by the Department of Local Government.

The SPES then reacted by passing resolution 1, where it reiterated its previous recognition of Alar and declared that the recall letter of Santos is void and has no legal basis and was issued by Santos because of his whimsical, capricious, and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due process of law.

Santos then issued another recall letter. However, this time, it was addressed to Docena. Docena then instituted a mandamus case to recognize him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He also seeks to hold the SPES officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite of his clear title to the disputed office.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Alar should supersede that of Docena.

Held:

From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19, 1990, there is no question that it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capito's death. As such, it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to serve "until noon of June 30, 1992," in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution.

The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar.

Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy.

SPES also argue that the petitioner should have sought to enforce his claimed right in a petition not for mandamus but for quo warranto, as his purpose is to challenge Alar's title to the disputed office. That is only secondary in this case. The real purpose of the present petition is to compel the respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a member of the body by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local Government.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that the recognition and admission of the petitioner is not a ministerial duty, the respondents are asserting the discretion to review, and if they so decide, reject, the Secretary's appointment. They have no such authority. Faced with a strictly legal question, they had no right and competence to resolve it in their discretion. What they should have done was reserve their judgment on the matter, leaving it to the courts of justice to decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. As a local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President of the Philippines, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as her alter ego.

Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it accordingly. We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the prescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.

Issue: Is Docena entitled to damages?

The Court will make no award of damages, there being no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit erroneously.

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Abella vs Municipality of Naga

Facts:                       

The appellant through a resolution closed a road which ran through the public market and Abella’s property. Portion of the road was closed for the expansion of the public market. As a result of the closure and subsequent expansion permanent structures were built. These improvements chomped off the sidewalk and abutted to the petitioner’s property, they extended to the middle of a street depriving Abella of the use thereof. Abella sought damages from the CFI of Camarines Sur, which ruled in her favor by ordering the municipality to pay P300 pesos for damages. Aggrieved, the municipality appealed to the SC. 

 

Issue:

Whether or not the municipality is liable for damages considering that it merely exercised its police power to preserve peace and good order of the community and promote general welfare.

Held:

Yes. The municipality was not charged with any unlawful act, or with invading Abella’s property rights, it was not found guilty of any such acts. What is in issue in this case is the liability for damages. Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

“No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person.”

(G.R. No. L-3738, November 20, 1951)

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Lingating vs Comelec

Facts:

During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint was filed against him and several other individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds and violation RA No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.  Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal shortly thereafter.  The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.

Pending appeal,  then Vice‐Mayor Vicente  Imbing took his oath  and assumed the  office of  Mayor of  Lapuyan on  March 3,  1992 pursuant  to Section 68  of the  Local Gov't  Code which allows  for the  execution pending appeal  of administrative  decisions. From February 1992 to August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-91 nor has the Sanggunian resolved Sulong’s MR/Appeal.

In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position of Mayor of Lapuyan. On May  3, 2001, Lingating  file a petition for disqualification of Sulong on the ground  that the latter is disqualified  from running for any elective local  position having been removed  from office during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of  the Local  Government Code. Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final and executory since up to the filing of the disqualification case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Lapuyan.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.  Respondent Sulong filed an  MR arguing that the decision  in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and  executory; that at no time had he been removed  by virtue of the said decision, and  that  the issue  was moot and academic having been "overtaken   by the local elections  of May 11, 1992." 

Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that Sulong was succeeded by Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91 had indeed become final. Lingating also prayed that he be installed as Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.

The COMELEC First Division denied Lingating’s motion on the ground that the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. 

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing Aguinaldo v. COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic. It also ruled that respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated.    

Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC.  Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable case is Reyes v. COMELEC where the court held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC.  Hence, this petition.    

Issue:

Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election

Held:

The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter re-elected for another term. However, Aguinaldo is not applicable as at the time the case was decided, there was no provision similar to   40(b) of the LGC and hence, cannot be given retroactive effect. Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to this day, not final. (G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002)

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